

UN Security Council Elections as an Incentive for Compliance*

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August 30, 2019

Abstract

Existing theoretical models of the United Nations' Security Council elections predict that countries that have demands placed on them are rewarded with election to the Security Council. We show empirically that countries that have greater demands placed upon them by Security Council resolutions, are more likely to be elected. Furthermore, although countries comply with resolutions leading up to their election, compliance decreases after they are elected. Finally, we show that countries that have not been in the Security Council recently, and thus are due for election, have additional requests made on them.

Keywords: Election Incentives, Self-Enforcing Agreements, United Nations, UN Security Council, Security Council Resolutions.

JEL: D72, F53, F55

*We thank Giovanni Maggi and Mushfiq Mobarak for helpful comments. Preliminary results were presented at seminars at the University of Tokyo, Kyoto University, Hitotsubashi University, the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, and Musashi University. We also thank Azusa Matsumoto for valuable research assistance.

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1 Introduction

The main goal of the United Nations' Security Council is to promote international peace. In the first half of 2019, the Security Council has deployed almost 100000 peacekeepers through its resolutions. Security Council resolutions have also authorized intervention such as the 1990 Gulf War. Since 1966, the Security Council has consisted of five permanent members (P5) and ten rotating members chosen by elections from regional groups.¹

Enforcement of Security Council resolutions relies on the participation of member states, and thus these members must have an incentive to implement such resolutions.² Theoretical models of this form have been studied by Maggi and Morelli (2006) and Caro-Burnett (2018). In certain cases the best way to provide incentives to countries to carry out resolutions is to elect different countries to a voting council depending on the state of the world: the countries elected tend to be those that have the greatest demands placed upon them by the resolutions.³

In this paper, we provide the first quantitative examination of compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. We also examine the number of resolutions naming a particular country and the depth of the demands that are made upon each country, because the theoretical models motivating our analysis suggest that resolutions will tend to be passed when compliance can be expected.

Our main empirical tools are logit and ordinary least squares. Our main data set is the International Peace Institute's (IPI) compliance data on Security Council resolutions. We show that countries that have greater demands placed upon them are more likely to be elected to the Council, in line with the

¹From its creation after WW2 up until 1965, the Security Council had only six rotating member in addition to the five veto holders: China, France, Russia, The United Kingdom, and The United States.

²Historically, most Security Council votes have been unanimous. The reason for this unanimous outcome is not that the members agree with each other on all important international matters. Rather it is because of the voting system at the Council: resolutions must be approved by nine members including the five permanent members. Thus, the most divisive issues are not taken up, and the Council focuses instead on issues where a near consensus can be reached.

³This claim is a conclusion of our results. See table 7.

theoretical predictions in Caro-Burnett (2018). We then move beyond those theoretical predictions, and show that countries have more resolutions requesting their cooperation in years when they are due for election, but on the other hand are less likely to comply with resolutions after having been elected.⁴

The change in countries' behavior before and after their election to the Security Council provides an important source of variation to justify the causal model that we based our hypothesis tests on. If contrary to our assumptions, countries have demands placed upon them by the Security Council because they are the cooperative type of country and they are then elected by the Security Council because they are this type of country, then we would not expect their behavior to change after their election. By looking at compliance with Security Council resolutions before and after election to the council, we have an event study style of framework, where we can show that, after election, countries that were previously cooperative shirk on their obligations.

Our final set of regression results provides an extension to the existing empirical literature. Dreher and Vreeland (2014) analyze the determinants of elections on the Security Council. They show that GNP, population, and the number of years off the Security Council have a positive effect on the probability of being elected as a non-permanent member. Their 'turn-taking' variable indicates that the longer a country is not elected, the more likely it is to become a member of the Security Council. In this paper we combine the Dreher and Vreeland (2014) data with the data on Security Council resolutions from IPI and show that countries that have not been elected recently, and are thus 'due for election,' are likely to have additional demands placed upon them by the Security Council.

The remainder of the paper has the following structure: In section 2, we discuss the theoretical

⁴Previous research has shown that there is a relationship between which members have been elected to the Security Council and what issues are taken up for consideration. See Malone (2000) for a qualitative discussion and Maggi and Morelli (2006) for a brief theoretical explanation. However, the first full theoretical explanation for this phenomenon was presented in Caro-Burnett (2018).

justification for our study. In section 3 we discuss the data sets we used. Finally, in section 4 we show our results.

1.1 Related Literature

In addition to our extension to Dreher and Vreeland (2014), we find our empirical results are generally in accordance with findings previously reported in the literature. The three most closely related papers are Benson and Kathman (2014), Beardsley and Schmidt (2012), and Gilligan and Stedman (2003).

Benson and Kathman (2014) study the bias of United Nations' resolutions. They define the bias as the instances when a resolution explicitly mentions one of the parties in a conflict. They find that troop-Commitment by the UN is positively correlated with their measure of bias. However, their definition for bias does not perfectly capture the actual UN bias. For instance, if a party is noticeable the 'bad guy,' it will be mentioned more in the resolution. That does not mean that the UN is biased against that party. Their study relates to ours in the sense that parties who do not comply can be seen as the bad guys. An alternative, and perhaps more appropriate for politicians, way to improve on compliance is by rewarding the 'cooperative guys.' We find that indeed compliance and elections for Security Council seats are positively correlated.⁵

Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) use a database from The Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions to code a dummy indicating alliance with the P5 countries. They find that UN Resolutions present no bias towards interests of P5. However, theoretically, the voting mechanism as described in the UN charter implicitly dictates that resolutions passed will represent the interests of the 15 Security Council members, which includes the P5. In addition, the P5 usually have conflicted interests among them. For instance, the idea of how different preferences among the P5 affects the outcomes is studied in

⁵See table 7.

Voeten (2001). We find an analogous result for the case of the non-permanent members of the Security Council. We build on Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) work by considering a much larger data set, and show that the number of resolutions naming a country is uncorrelated with being part of the Security Council.

Gilligan and Stedman (2003) show that the number of deaths in battle increases the peacekeeping forces sent by the UN. Somewhat surprisingly, there is a negative bias towards Asia and no bias towards the Middle East. By considering resolutions rather than actual battle deaths, we have a larger data set and thus can include additional controls, in particular we separate the effects of Africa from the Middle East. We find an analogous result: the number of resolutions addressed to a country increases with the number of deaths in battle. Moreover, after adding religion dummies, we find that, as one would expect, Africa (not Asia) receives less attention from the UN.

2 Theoretical Motivation

We will begin our study by testing predictions derived from theoretical models on international organizations.⁶ Common sense would dictate that in order to implement desirable social outcomes, international organizations should allow all countries to vote. However, in reality we observe that this idea is distorted and even violated. For example, the IMF, World Bank, and European Union use voting weights that are heterogeneous among countries, and depend on specific variables (i.e. contributions to the organization, population, GDP, etc.). A more striking example, which is the subject of this study, is the case of the United Nations. This organization seems to follow a voting rule that is in a completely different class of social choices. While all the members vote at the General Assembly,

⁶Maggi and Morelli (2006) and Caro-Burnett (2018)

the agreements reached at that instance are not compulsory and can only work as a recommendation to be considered by the Security Council. The Security Council votes on relevant and compulsory issues but only a subset of the members has the right to vote.⁷ Moreover, except from the P5 who are always part of the Security Council, there is uncertainty on which countries will have the right to vote in the future.

Table 1: Distribution of Power

Years in Power	Number of Countries
74 years(*)	5
12 - 22 years	8
8 - 10 years	16
5 - 7 years	27
3 - 4 years	29
1 - 2 years	41
Never	67
Total	193

As of 2018. (*) The five permanent members also hold veto power.

This presence of randomness in the voting power is, however, not idiosyncratic. For instance, one can easily see that some countries have been historically part of the Security Council more often than others. Table 1 shows a summary of the historical distribution of power among the 193 United Nations' current members. In addition, there is still large heterogeneity even among the countries most often in power. Table 2 shows a more detailed distribution of the most commonly (non-permanent) elected countries. From these tables, we can see that voting power in the Security Council is heterogeneous even if we only look at non permanent members. Some countries are part of the Security Council much more often than others. Indeed, out of the 193 current UN members, 67 have never been part of the Security Council.

⁷Members are expected to follow the Security Council decisions, else they may receive sanctions from the rest of the members.

Table 2: Top 20 non-permanent countries most often in the Security Council

Years in Power	Country	Region
22	Japan	Asia
20	Brazil	Latin America
18	Argentina	Latin America
14	Pakistan	Asia
14	India	Asia
14	Colombia	Latin America
13	Italy	WEO
12	Canada	WEO
10	Nigeria	Africa
10	Germany	WEO
10	Netherlands	WEO
10	Poland	Eastern Europe
10	Chile	Latin America
10	Australia	WEO
10	Venezuela	Latin America
10	Panama	Latin America
10	Belgium	WEO
10	Spain	WEO
9	Peru	Latin America
9	Egypt	Africa

As of 2018. The five permanent members were excluded from the ranking. Some non-European countries have been included by the UN in the Western European group (WEO): Australia, Canada and Israel. The classification of regions has been changed once in 1966, but we use the current classification for simplicity.

Despite this complex structure that seems so different from other organizations, Caro-Burnett (2018) shows that all these voting rules can be rationalized by the same ‘optimal mechanism.’ It just happens that certain parameter conditions make the UN strikingly different. A testable implication of that optimal mechanism is that the probability of election at the Security Council depends on whether the organization has made a costly request of the country. We use data measuring the difficulty of compliance with resolutions as coded by the IPI, and we will show in section 4.1 that indeed the implications of Caro-Burnett (2018) are satisfied empirically. In addition to the direct predictions of this theory, we investigate more generally the idea that the election to the Security Council is a reward. First, we show that after a country is elected, its compliance with United Nations’ resolutions decreases (section 4.2). Second, we show that when a country is due to election (has not been a member for a long time), the organization places more resolutions to that country (section 4.3).

3 Data

We use three data sets. The first covers compliance regarding civil war resolutions, and it was coded by the International Peace Institute. The IPI coded a data set consisting on all UN resolutions on civil war from 1989 to 2003. For each resolution, expert coders classified the depth of demand that a resolution made on a targeted country on a scale of one to three. Then, they classified the degree to which a country complied with this demand in the short term (six months) and in the medium term (twelve months). Compliance was measured on a scale of one to four. Table 3 shows a list of the variables used.

The three variables relevant to our study are: Depth of Demand, Short Term Compliance, and Medium Term Compliance. Depth of Demand captures the difficulty of the request imposed by the

UN on the party addressed. According to the IPI's coding manual, *"the greatly varying degree of a demand's intrusiveness explains why the costs associated with compliance with some demands create high incentives for non-compliance while compliance with others does not raise any significant costs."* This illustrates how the coding method directly relates to the payoffs in Caro-Burnett (2018); therefore, the probability of being elected should be higher when more difficult demands are being imposed to a country.⁸ The Depth of Demand was coded in three levels: low, medium and high.

Compliance with the low Depth of Demand *"does not put the survival of the addressee as an organized group, or even the life of its senior members, at a significant risk."* Compliance with medium level *"makes it significantly more difficult for the demand addressee to attain victory in the civil war or to win power in its aftermath."* Finally, compliance with the high level *"puts the survival of the demand addressee as an organized group, or even the life of its senior members, at a significant risk."* Note that while compliance with demands of low and medium level seems plausible, the high level Depth of Demand seems excessive and not many parties would be willing to fully comply.⁹

The other two variables from IPI's data set that are relevant to our study are the Short and Medium Term Compliance. The assessment of compliance was done by two coders independently, and then the final score was reconciled using their source material. According to the IPI's coding manual, the assessment of compliance *"is based on personal judgmentthe best way to do so is to base all assessments on primary and secondary sources, and to document what these documents tell us about compliance. Therefore we (IPI) have documented the sources that formed the basis of our coding decisions on the compliance variables."* Compliance was measured in four levels: non or low compliance; medium to

⁸In the mentioned study, countries with higher costs are expected to have a higher voting weight. Which in turns translates in a higher probability of election.

⁹This suggests that perhaps the UN does not expect compliance on high Depth of Demand resolutions; and therefore the medium level are the resolutions that are relevant to be considered for rewards. We can see this effect on table 7, where only the compliance to level 2 of Depth of Demand is significant.

low compliance; medium to high compliance; and full or almost full compliance. Finally, the Short Term Compliance is measured based on evidence found six months after the adoption of a resolution; while Medium Term Compliance is measured using evidence found twelve months after the adoption of a resolution. In addition, we coded a few more dummy variables at the resolution level to help us categorize the data.

Table 3: List of Variables from the International Peace Institute (data at the Security-Council-resolution by country level)

Variable	Description	Mean	SD	Dummy = 1
Depth of Demand	Measure of the difficulty of the request from the UN to a specific country on a specific resolution. Measured from 1 to 3.	2.06	0.72	
Short Term Compliance	Compliance of a specific country on a specific resolution. Measured from 1 to 4, within six months after the resolution was passed.	1.95	0.93	
Medium Term Compliance	Compliance of a specific country on a specific resolution. Measured from 1 to 4, within twelve months after the resolution was passed.	2.00	0.86	
Depth 1	Dummy indicating whether a resolution had a Depth of Demand equal to 1.	0.23	0.42	572
Depth 2	Dummy indicating whether a resolution had a Depth of Demand equal to 2.	0.47	0.49	1160
Short Term Compliance 1	Dummy for whether the compliance of the resolution was of level 1.	0.37	0.48	928
Short Term Compliance 2	Dummy for whether the compliance of the resolution was of level 2.	0.37	0.48	919
Short Term Compliance 3	Dummy for whether the compliance of the resolution was of level 3.	0.16	0.37	409

The five dummy variables were coded by the authors. We include them in this list (and not in table 4) because they required only minor computation. Data is available for a total of 2465 resolution-country pairs. We consider only the countries named in the resolutions, and ignore non-state parties. There are no missing values.

Table 4 describes some additional variables we have generated for our analysis in order to summarize the data on compliance at the country level. First, we want to average the depth of demand imposed to each country. However, there are several countries that only have small requests and other countries

have strong request placed upon them. We believe that for countries in the later group, small requests may not be relevant. Therefore, for those countries who had only depths of demand of level one in all resolutions in a year, we defined the average yearly depth of demand to be also one. However, for countries who had depths of demand of levels two and three, we ignored the resolutions with depth of demand of level one.¹⁰ Thus, their yearly average depth of demand for those countries is necessarily a number between two and three. We also averaged the compliance to resolutions by country by year at each of the three levels. Finally, we computed the interaction of the number of resolutions to each level of depth of demand times the average compliance to resolutions of that same depth of demand. To extend this data to the whole sample not involved in civil wars, we coded as zero the depth of demand of countries that have no demands placed on them, and we coded as missing the compliance of countries that have no demands placed on them.

¹⁰We use this approach rather than simply calculating a simple mean of all of the depths of demand because in the case that a more serious demand is place on a country, the number of minor demands is irrelevant, and thus taking a mean is inappropriate. It makes no difference if we code each country by the most serious demand place upon them. It also does not matter if we include a separate dummy variable for countries that have no demands placed upon them.

Table 4: List of Variables Coded by the Authors (coded at the country-year level)

Variable	Description	Obs	Mean	SD	Dummy = 1
Ave. Depth of Demand (adjusted)	We averaged the Depth of Demand, by country and year. For those countries who had values of 2 or 3, we ignored the values of 1.	2637	0.15	0.58	
Ave. Depth of Demand (adjusted) conditional on non-zero demand	We averaged the Depth of Demand, by country and year. For those countries who had values of 2 or 3, we ignored the values of 1.	172	2.33	0.33	
Ave. Comp. resolutions Depth 1	We averaged the level of Short Term Compliance by country and year, only of those resolutions with Depth of Demand equal to 1.	172	1.74	1.34	
Ave. Comp. resolutions Depth 2	We averaged the level of Short Term Compliance by country and year, only of those resolutions with Depth of Demand equal to 2.	172	1.90	0.77	
Ave. Comp. resolutions Depth 3	We averaged the level of Short Term Compliance by country and year, only of those resolutions with Depth of Demand equal to 3.	172	1.40	0.93	
Number of resolutions Depth 1	Number of resolutions with Depth of Demand equal to 1.	2637	0.20	1.29	
Number of resolutions Depth 2	Number of resolutions with Depth of Demand equal to 2.	2637	0.40	2.12	
Number of resolutions Depth 3	Number of resolutions with Depth of Demand equal to 3.	2637	0.26	1.44	
Interaction 1	Number of resolutions Depth 1 * Short Term Compliance 1.	172	6.94	9.22	
Interaction 2	Number of resolutions Depth 2 * Short Term Compliance 2.	172	12.06	10.99	
Interaction 3	Number of resolutions Depth 3 * Short Term Compliance 3.	172	6.95	7.16	
Average Short Term Compliance	We averaged the level of Short Term Compliance by country and year for all levels of depth of demand.	172	2.09	0.64	
Average Medium Term Compliance	We averaged the level of Medium Term Compliance by country and year for all levels of depth of demand.	172	2.12	0.62	
Change in Compliance	The difference between Average Medium Term Compliance and Average Short Term Compliance.	172	0.03	0.35	
Log number of Resolutions Elected	Log (number of resolutions + 1)	2637	0.15	0.61	
Eligible	Dummy indicating whether a country was elected at the Security Council Elections in year t , to become a member in year $t + 1$.	2637	0.03	0.17	75
Any Resolution	Following the UN Charter, a country is eligible if it is not a current SC member and was not a member on the previous year.	2637	0.94	0.23	2487
	Dummy indicating whether a country was mentioned in any resolution in that year.	2637	0.07	0.25	172

Data is available for a total of 2637 country-year pairs. Of these, 172 pairs correspond to country years where there is a resolution. For the pairs where there is no resolution, we code the Depth of Demand as zero, and treat compliance data as missing. In appendix table A4, we analyze an alternative coding of the data where compliance is coded as zero when there is no resolution.

We used data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute of Oslo (UCDP-PRIO), which coded several data sets related to war. One of them is the Battle Deaths data set. As shown in table 5, we use three variables from this data set: a dummy indicating whether a country has had a conflict in a year; a dummy indicating whether a country has had a civil war in a year; and the number of battle deaths.

Table 5: List of Variables from UCDP-PRIO (at the country-year level)

Variable	Description	Obs	Mean	SD	Dummy = 1
Any War	Dummy for any conflict, by country and year.	2618	0.03	0.17	79
Civil War	Dummy for civil war, by country and year	2637	0.04	0.21	118
Log Battle Deaths	Log (Battle Deaths +1)	2637	0.87	2.14	

Data is available for a total of 2637 country-year pairs.

Finally, we use the data from Dreher and Vreeland (2014) as additional covariates for our study. We divide their variables in three sets, as displayed in table 6. The variables labeled as ‘main’ are variables that were the focus of their regressions. The variables labeled as ‘political’ are the ones we believe measure ideology. Finally, the third group ‘others’ are variables capturing language, religion, and alliances.

Table 6: List of Variables from Dreher and Vreeland (2014) (at the country-year level)

	Variable	Description	Obs	Mean	SD	Dummy = 1
Main	Log Area	Log (Total territory)	2637	11.34	2.63	
	Log GNI pc	Log (GNI per capital)	2637	7.45	1.56	
	Log Pop	Log (Population)	2637	15.30	2.06	
	Rotation Norm	Number of years since last election/Number of members in regional group	2424	0.94	0.84	
Political	Democracy	Dummy for Democracy	2621	0.54	0.50	1405
	inlinerus2	Share of votes inline with Russia at the UNGA	2624	0.55	0.15	
	inlineusa2	Share of votes inline with the US at the UNGA	2624	0.16	0.10	
	IMF	Dummy for participating on a IMF program	2621	0.36	0.48	933
	lunpkave	Log (Monthly average peace keeping troops)	2622	1.68	2.49	
	lusaaid	Log (US development aid +1)	2637	12.04	7.51	
	lusmilaid	Log (US military assistance +1)	2637	8.64	6.93	
	pariah	Dummy for countries subject to sanctions	2637	0.06	0.23	146
Others	wb	Number of Work Bank projects started	2637	1.49	2.25	
	Arab	Dummy for Arab	2637	0.03	0.17	74
	Britcol	Dummy for former British Colony	2626	0.30	0.46	799
	Francecol	Dummy for former French Colony	2637	0.10	0.30	255
	EU	Dummy for European Union	2637	0.07	0.25	174
	g77andnam	Dummy for G77 and NAM	2637	0.62	0.49	1622
	g77notnam	Dummy for G77 and no NAM	2637	0.10	0.30	267
	namnotg77	Dummy for NAM and not G77	2637	0.02	0.15	
	idealshare	Proportion of the largest share among chief executives	2389	0.20	0.20	
	Corrupt	Measure of Corruption	2436	-0.05	0.99	
	muslim	Share of muslims	2622	0.25	0.37	
	cath	Share of catholics	2622	0.34	0.36	
	nato	Dummy for NATO	2624	0.08	0.27	207
	oic	Dummy for OIC	2637	0.29	0.45	760
	juscanz	Dummy for Juscanz	2637	0.07	0.25	172

4 Results

4.1 Elections and Compliance

First, we will explore how compliance with UN resolutions is related with elections for seats at the Security Council. We want to predict which countries are elected in each region. If we were only considering one region, exactly one country was elected each time, and the same countries were eligible each period, then our data could be analyzed using a standard logit model. In the data we have, however, there are multiple heterogeneous regions, zero or multiple countries elected from different regions, and some countries are ineligible in some periods. We will thus use a conditional logistic model following McFadden (1973). Moreover, we will make modifications to our data such that it fits the requirements for that method.

An election for a single region in a single year, will be a ‘single choice’ in the framework of McFadden (1973). In the West-Europe region, two members are elected every second year; and in Africa, two members are elected for even years and one member is elected for odd years. Elections where multiple members are chosen, do not fit directly into the desired choice framework. In these cases, we duplicate some data in the following way: in an election where countries c and c' are elected, we replace this election with two separate elections. One containing country c and all the other non-elected countries, the other containing c' and all the other non-elected countries. The first of these two elections shows that country c is preferred over all the other countries, except possibly for c' . The second of these two elections shows that country c' is preferred over all the other countries, except possibly for c . The result is a total of 75 independent elections in our modified data. In each of these elections, countries that served in the Security Council the previous year are ineligible for election,¹¹ we thus eliminate

¹¹As stated by the UN Charter.

them from the set of choices.

We are interested in how demands that the Security Council has previously made to countries may influence the election in the following council. If a country c , with attributes X is in choice group $B = (R, t)$, where R is a region and t is a period; then, the odds ratio of its election is defined as follows:

$$P(c|X, B) = \frac{e^{V(X, c, \hat{c})}}{e^{\sum_{c' \in R} V(X, c', \hat{c})}}$$

where \hat{c} is any ‘benchmark’ country of that region. Following McFadden (1973), the function $V(\cdot)$, is assumed to be linearly separable: $V(X, c, \hat{c}) = v(X, c) - v(X, \hat{c})$. Moreover, the ‘utility indicator’ function $v(\cdot)$ is assumed to be linear. Thus, considering a single election on a single choice set $B = (R, t)$:

$$\begin{aligned} v(X, c) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Depth_c + \beta_2 ResolutionsNumber_c + \beta_3 Compliance_c \\ & + \beta_4 (ResolutionsNumber_c \times Compliance_c) + \gamma Controls_c \end{aligned}$$

where $Depth_c$ is the average depth of demand made by Security Council resolutions directed to that country, $ResolutionsNumber_c$ is the number of resolutions directed to that country, and $Compliance_c$ is the average compliance of directed at that country. Finally, $Controls_c$ are a set of 29 control variables as used in Dreher and Vreeland (2014).

Table 7 shows that the coefficient of the Average Depth of Demand is positive, which indicates that countries that were asked to perform a more serious demand are more likely to be elected to the

Table 7: Security Council Elections from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Elected				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Average Depth of Demand (adjusted)	2.374** (0.963)	2.267** (0.919)	2.516*** (0.945)	2.641*** (0.992)	3.345** (1.313)
Number of Resolutions Depth 1	0.401 (1.088)	0.627 (1.128)	1.029 (1.247)	1.547 (1.329)	1.643 (1.515)
Number of Resolutions Depth 2	-0.939 (0.769)	-0.981 (0.739)	-1.098 (0.729)	-1.134 (0.732)	-1.323 (0.808)
Number of Resolutions Depth 3	-1.402 (0.944)	-1.231 (0.887)	-1.342 (0.929)	-1.355 (0.929)	-1.814 (1.257)
Average Compliance Depth 1	-0.0757 (0.711)	-0.0541 (0.713)	0.186 (0.788)	0.511 (0.875)	0.572 (0.927)
Average Compliance Depth 2	-2.383* (1.235)	-2.225* (1.170)	-2.409** (1.200)	-2.527** (1.243)	-3.325** (1.667)
Average Compliance Depth 3	-3.892* (2.135)	-3.735* (2.030)	-3.731* (2.088)	-3.896* (2.236)	-4.699* (2.820)
Interaction 1	-0.322 (0.648)	-0.410 (0.665)	-0.685 (0.767)	-0.998 (0.870)	-1.175 (0.998)
Interaction 2	0.755* (0.439)	0.761* (0.426)	0.865** (0.427)	0.909** (0.441)	1.102** (0.550)
Interaction 3	0.654 (0.493)	0.576 (0.460)	0.592 (0.485)	0.602 (0.493)	0.800 (0.644)
Civil War		-1.097 (1.026)	-1.567 (1.038)	-1.572 (1.087)	-1.458 (1.135)
Any War		-0.733 (1.132)	-1.337 (1.134)	-1.564 (1.151)	-1.683 (1.226)
Rotation Norm			0.147 (0.202)	0.351 (0.216)	0.468** (0.238)
Log GNI/pc			0.508*** (0.115)	0.539*** (0.159)	0.703*** (0.227)
Log Population			0.621*** (0.124)	0.559*** (0.141)	0.686*** (0.178)
Log Area			-0.0594 (0.0957)	-0.0789 (0.1000)	-0.151 (0.128)
Observations	2,688	2,656	2,585	2,541	2,099
War Data	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Main D&V	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political D&V	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Others D&V	No	No	No	No	Yes

Conditional (fixed effects) logistic estimation at the country level, for each UN region and and year. Eligible countries are not current member and members not leaving the SC in the year of analysis. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. *Elected* is a dummy variable for the election of a non-permanent member to the Security Council. Columns (4) and (5) include several other covariates from Dreher and Vreeland (2014). Some countries don't have all variables available. Column (1) has all possible observations. However, the panel is still imbalanced since the number of eligible countries changes through time.

Security Council.¹² Columns (2) to (5) show that the result is robust to the introduction of additional covariates.

In order to interpret the coefficients, we use the semi-elasticities approach.¹³ The coefficients for using this method are displayed in the appendix table A2.¹⁴ For instance, in column (5) of that table, the semi-elasticity of the election with respect to the Average Depth of Demand is 3.2, indicating that if the United Nations were to increase the difficulty of its demands towards a country, that country would be 3.2% more likely to be elected. To give a more precise example, the probability of election conditional on region for, say, Spain is: 18.18% in the 1989-2003 sample.¹⁵ If the Average Depth of Demand towards Spain were to increase by one unit, then its probability of election would become 18.76%.

4.2 Compliance and Eligibility

In table 7, we analyzed how the probability of being elected at the Security Council depends on the demands made upon a country. This leads to a subsequent question: how do countries comply with the demands made upon them?

In our data, compliance is measured six months (short term) and twelve months (medium term) after each resolution. While Security Council elections occur near the end of the year,¹⁶ Security Council Resolutions are passed throughout the year. Thus, in many cases, the short term compliance for a certain country will be observed before the election. The easiest case to consider is June, the

¹²Replacing our Depth of Demand coding with a simple dummy variable equal to one if any resolution making a demand to that country was passed, does not substantially change the results.

¹³Percent change of the dependent variable as a result of a (level) change of the independent variable.

¹⁴See Kitazawa (2012) for details on the methodology.

¹⁵Spain was elected twice while being eligible eleven times.

¹⁶Although in recent year, elections have been scheduled to the middle of the year, they happen at the end of the year in our sample. See table A1 in the Appendix.

most popular month for Security Council resolutions in our data set. For a resolution passed in June, short term compliance is known at the moment of Security Council elections, but compliance beyond the short term is unknown. If we are interested in how being elected to the Security Council affects compliance with resolutions, we are mainly interested in compliance beyond the short term. Our dependent variable will thus be medium term compliance, and we will include short term compliance as a control variable in the regression. This specification is not ideal, because some resolutions are passed late in the year, and thus, short term compliance may not be fully observed. However, our results in fact become stronger when we drop those resolutions from the data set.¹⁷

In addition to the effect of actually being elected upon compliance, we may be interested in the effect of already being a member of Security Council as well as the effect of a country being due for election in the near future. The best way of measuring this second effect is provided by Dreher and Vreeland (2014)'s variable 'rotation norm.' They define the rotation norm for a country as the number of years since that country's last election to the Security Council divided by the total number of eligible countries from its region. Our estimating equation based on the data set of UN resolutions on a given year will be:

$$MidTermComp_c = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Elected_c + \beta_2 SC_c + \beta_3 RotationNorm_c + \gamma Controls_c$$

where $MidTermComp_c$ is country c 's Average Medium Term Compliance, $Elected_c$ indicates whether the country was elected, and $RotationNorm_c$ is the Rotation Norm. $Controls_c$ include covariates from Dreher and Vreeland (2014), Short Term Compliance, and the Average Depth of Demand.

Column (1) of table 8 shows that countries that are elected to the Security Council are less likely to

¹⁷These results are available upon request. Another source of concern might be resolutions passed very early in the year; where medium term compliance would be partially observed by the time of the elections. Dropping the first three months of resolutions does not change the results either.

comply with resolutions after they have been elected. The coefficient of -0.43 shows that the effect of election decreases compliance by almost half a point on a four-point scale. The number of observations for this analysis is the 172 country-year pairs for which at least one resolution requested that country's compliance. This is smaller than the number of observations considered in table 7 that examined the relationship between election and depth of demand made by a resolution. This is because the absence of a resolution corresponds to no demand being made and thus it makes sense to include as zeros countries that were not named in resolutions for the analysis in table 7. On the other hand, it does not make sense to include as zeros these countries for the analysis of compliance in table 8, because these countries had no resolutions to comply with, and thus should not be coded as non-compliant.¹⁸

Column (2) shows that there is no effect of Security Council membership on medium term compliance after controlling for short term compliance. This is because the incentive to shirk increases only in the year that countries are actually elected, and thus we would not expect medium term compliance to change relative to short term compliance merely by virtue of the fact that a country is on the Security Council.

Column (5), shows that countries that are due for election based on the rotation norm of Dreher and Vreeland (2014), are more likely to comply with resolutions. Being recently elected removes the incentives for countries to comply and being due for election increases their compliance. We investigate the rotation norm more closely in section 4.3. Columns (3), (4) and (6) show that the results in columns (1) and (5) are robust to the inclusion of new variables. In appendix table A3 we show that our results are robust to looking at the change in compliance, and in appendix table A5 we show that our results are also robust to an ordered logit specification.¹⁹

¹⁸For completeness, we perform the analysis shown in table 8 using all the observations and including a dummy for countries that have at least one resolution on a given year. This is shown in appendix table A4. The results remain statistically significant, but the magnitude of the coefficient of interest is understandably reduced.

¹⁹The number of observations for table A5 is larger, because the unit of observation is individual resolutions rather

Table 8: Medium Term Compliance to Resolutions on Civil War from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Medium Term Compliance at the country level					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Elected	-0.434*** (0.164)		-0.436*** (0.165)	-0.445*** (0.166)	-0.466*** (0.165)	-0.534*** (0.167)
Security Council		-0.0309 (0.138)	-0.0404 (0.135)	-0.0435 (0.138)	-0.0649 (0.192)	-0.114 (0.193)
Rotation Norm					0.0759*** (0.0252)	0.0253 (0.0329)
Short Term Compliance	0.825*** (0.0395)	0.830*** (0.0404)	0.825*** (0.0397)	0.824*** (0.0401)	0.805*** (0.0416)	0.791*** (0.0417)
Average Depth of Demand (adjusted)	0.147* (0.0778)	0.146* (0.0794)	0.147* (0.0780)	0.151* (0.0791)	0.126 (0.0791)	0.135* (0.0789)
Civil War				-0.0429 (0.0654)	0.00464 (0.0677)	0.0341 (0.0690)
Any War				0.00820 (0.0642)	0.0713 (0.0690)	0.101 (0.0729)
Log GNI/pc						0.0564* (0.0314)
Log Population						-0.0175 (0.0425)
Log Area						-0.0272 (0.0223)
Constant	0.0603 (0.217)	0.0417 (0.221)	0.0614 (0.218)	0.0612 (0.219)	0.0421 (0.220)	0.369 (0.675)
Observations	172	172	172	172	164	164

OLS estimation at the country level. Compliance is measured from 1 to 4. * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001.

4.3 Number of Resolutions

Dreher and Vreeland (2014) show that countries are elected to the Security Council on a rotation basis. This means that countries that held a Security Council seat in the immediate past are unlikely to be elected, and countries that have not held the seat for a long time are much more likely to be elected. We test whether the United Nations put countries who are up for election on a trial, by giving them extra tasks. That is, we consider the relationship between the number of resolutions that request an action by a country and the rotation norm variable.

$$\text{LogNumberResolutions}_c = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{RotationNorm}_c + \beta_2 \text{LogBattleDeaths}_c + \gamma \text{Controls}_c$$

Column (2) of table 9 shows that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the rotation norm and the log number of resolutions requested to a specific country. The standard deviation for the rotation norm is 0.86, and thus given the coefficient of 0.1 in column (2), a one-standard deviation change in the value of rotation norm would lead to a change of approximately 8.6% in the number of resolutions that a country was asked to comply with. This corresponds to an increase of slightly more than one resolution in the case of a country that has been named in 13 resolutions (which is the yearly average number of resolutions among those countries involved in a civil war).²⁰

Columns (3), (4), and (5) show that this relationship is mostly unchanged when controlling for the

than a country-year average compliance.

²⁰Column (1) shows that UN Security Council resolutions are responsive to the size of the conflicts. Variables associated with ‘being in war’ clearly have a positive effect on the number of resolutions placed upon a country. Therefore, a potential issue might be that not being elected for a long time might be related with such war variables. Thus, we include in columns (2) - (5) the regression dummies for war and the number of battle deaths. These columns show that the rotation norm has a significant and positive effect on the number of resolutions beyond what war variables might explain.

Table 9: Log Number of Resolutions by Country from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Log Number of Resolutions				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rotation Norm		0.106*** (0.0147)	0.0843*** (0.0158)	0.0386* (0.0207)	0.0658*** (0.0212)
Log Battle Deaths	0.0674*** (0.00595)	0.0652*** (0.00645)	0.0599*** (0.00643)	0.0577*** (0.00685)	0.0563*** (0.00682)
Civil War	0.186*** (0.0607)	0.175*** (0.0620)	0.204*** (0.0623)	0.213*** (0.0638)	0.207*** (0.0628)
Any War	0.996*** (0.0646)	0.990*** (0.0670)	0.982*** (0.0664)	0.892*** (0.0705)	0.849*** (0.0695)
Security Council	-0.0250 (0.0468)	0.0479 (0.0647)	0.0695 (0.0638)	0.0725 (0.0647)	0.0414 (0.0638)
Log GNI/pc		-0.0559*** (0.00783)	-0.0372*** (0.0110)	-0.0268* (0.0160)	0.00177 (0.0165)
Log Population		-0.0199** (0.0101)	-0.0103 (0.0110)	-0.0177 (0.0132)	0.00639 (0.0135)
Log Area		0.0124 (0.00781)	0.00540 (0.00782)	-0.00600 (0.00932)	-0.0116 (0.00927)
Constant	0.0536*** (0.0121)	0.536*** (0.128)	0.351** (0.149)	0.741*** (0.246)	0.173 (0.262)
Observations	2,618	2,424	2,411	2,092	2,092
War Data	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Main D&V	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political D&V	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Others D&V	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Region F.E.	No	No	No	No	Yes

OLS estimation of the number of resolutions as a function of the number of battle deaths and the rotation norm, at the country level. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Columns (4) and (5) include several other covariates from Dreher and Vreeland (2014). Regional groups are defined by the UN, The dummy for Western Europe was omitted.

variables used in Dreher and Vreeland (2014) as well as region fixed effects. The lowest estimated coefficient is that in column (4), which corresponds to a change of 0.4 resolutions for a one standard deviation change in the rotation norm for a country that has been named in 13 resolutions.

5 Conclusions

In this paper we have shown that election to the Security Council offers incentives for countries to comply with Security Council resolutions. In the political economy literature, the response of politicians to incentives for re-election is a frequent subject of study, some examples are Nordhaus (1975) and Dick and Lott Jr (1993). However, to our knowledge, the incentives provided by potential election to the Security Council have not been studied in the empirical literature.

One aspect of Security Council elections that we do not consider in this paper is that countries are competing with each other for a fixed number of Security Council seats. If countries are elected based in part on their performance in complying with Security Council resolutions, then election to the Security Council resembles a tournament. Future research could thus consider whether models such as Lazear and Rosen (1981) could be useful in explaining decisions regarding compliance and elections to the Security Council.

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A Additional Tables

Table A1: Dates of Security Council Elections

Membership starting in	Election
1989	26-Oct-88
1990	18-Oct-89
1991	1-Nov-90
1992	16-Oct-91
1993	27-Oct-92
1994	29-Oct-93
1995	20-Oct-94
1996	8-Nov-95
1997	21-Oct-96
1998	14-Oct-97
1999	8-Oct-98
2000	14-Oct-99
2001	10-Oct-00
2002	8-Oct-01
2003	27-Sep-02

In general, elections happened at the end of the year. Therefore, most of short term compliance of a given year is observed at the moment of election. On the other hand, medium term compliance is usually only partially observed.

Table A2: Average Semi-elasticities: Security Council Elections from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Elected				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Average Depth of Demand (adjusted)	2.308** (0.937)	2.204** (0.894)	2.444*** (0.918)	2.566*** (0.965)	3.241** (1.273)
Number of resolutions Depth 1	0.390 (1.057)	0.609 (1.096)	1.000 (1.212)	1.503 (1.292)	1.592 (1.468)
Number of resolutions Depth 2	-0.913 (0.747)	-0.954 (0.719)	-1.067 (0.709)	-1.102 (0.711)	-1.282 (0.783)
Number of resolutions Depth 3	-1.362 (0.918)	-1.197 (0.863)	-1.304 (0.902)	-1.317 (0.903)	-1.758 (1.218)
Average Compliance Depth 1	-0.0735 (0.691)	-0.0526 (0.693)	0.180 (0.765)	0.497 (0.850)	0.554 (0.898)
Average Compliance Depth 2	-2.316* (1.200)	-2.163* (1.138)	-2.341** (1.166)	-2.456** (1.208)	-3.222** (1.616)
Average Compliance Depth 3	-3.784* (2.076)	-3.632* (1.974)	-3.625* (2.029)	-3.786* (2.173)	-4.554* (2.732)
Interaction 1	-0.313 (0.629)	-0.399 (0.647)	-0.666 (0.746)	-0.969 (0.846)	-1.138 (0.967)
Interaction 2	0.734* (0.427)	0.740* (0.414)	0.840** (0.415)	0.884** (0.429)	1.068** (0.533)
Interaction 3	0.636 (0.479)	0.560 (0.447)	0.575 (0.471)	0.585 (0.479)	0.775 (0.624)
Civil War		-1.066 (0.998)	-1.522 (1.008)	-1.528 (1.056)	-1.412 (1.100)
Any War		-0.713 (1.100)	-1.299 (1.102)	-1.520 (1.119)	-1.630 (1.188)
Rotation Norm			0.143 (0.197)	0.341 (0.210)	0.454** (0.230)
Log GNI/pc			0.493*** (0.112)	0.524*** (0.154)	0.681*** (0.220)
Log Population			0.604*** (0.120)	0.543*** (0.137)	0.665*** (0.173)
Log Area			-0.0577 (0.0930)	-0.0767 (0.0972)	-0.146 (0.124)
Observations	2,688	2,656	2,585	2,541	2,099
Compliance Data	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
War Data	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Main D&V	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political D&V	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Others D&V	No	No	No	No	Yes

Conditional logistic for the semi-elasticities at the country level, for each UN region and and year. Eligible countries are not current member and members not leaving the SC in the year of analysis. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. *Elected* is a dummy variable for the election of a non-permanent member to the Security Council. Columns (4) and (5) include several other covariates from Dreher and Vreeland (2014). Some countries don't have all variables available. Column (1) has all possible observations. However, the panel is still imbalanced since the number of eligible countries changes through time.

Table A3: Change from Short to Medium Term Compliance to Resolutions on Civil War from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Change in Compliance					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Elected	-0.434*** (0.164)		-0.436*** (0.165)	-0.445*** (0.166)	-0.466*** (0.165)	-0.534*** (0.167)
Security Council		-0.0309 (0.138)	-0.0404 (0.135)	-0.0435 (0.138)	-0.0649 (0.192)	-0.114 (0.193)
Rotation Norm					0.0759*** (0.0252)	0.0253 (0.0329)
Short Term Compliance	-0.175*** (0.0395)	-0.170*** (0.0404)	-0.175*** (0.0397)	-0.176*** (0.0401)	-0.195*** (0.0416)	-0.209*** (0.0417)
Average Depth of Demand (adjusted)	0.147* (0.0778)	0.146* (0.0794)	0.147* (0.0780)	0.151* (0.0791)	0.126 (0.0791)	0.135* (0.0789)
Civil War				-0.0429 (0.0654)	0.00464 (0.0677)	0.0341 (0.0690)
Any War				0.00820 (0.0642)	0.0713 (0.0690)	0.101 (0.0729)
Log GNI/pc						0.0564* (0.0314)
Log Population						-0.0175 (0.0425)
Log Area						-0.0272 (0.0223)
Constant	0.0603 (0.217)	0.0417 (0.221)	0.0614 (0.218)	0.0612 (0.219)	0.0421 (0.220)	0.369 (0.675)
Observations	172	172	172	172	164	164

OLS estimation for the change in compliance from Short to Medium term. Compliance is measured from 1 to 4. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. *Depth i* and *Short Term Compliance j* are dummy variables for the difficulty of the task (measured between 1 and 3), and the compliance within one year (measured between 1 and 4).

Table A4: Medium Term Compliance to Resolutions, including all countries, on Civil War from 1989 to 2003

VARIABLES	Medium Term Compliance at the country level					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Elected	-0.0232** (0.00978)		-0.0234** (0.00979)	-0.0239** (0.00990)	-0.0217** (0.0102)	-0.0247** (0.0103)
Security Council		-0.00126 (0.00703)	-0.00197 (0.00703)	-0.00199 (0.00706)	-0.000421 (0.0101)	-0.00348 (0.0102)
Rotation Norm					0.00700*** (0.00213)	0.00764*** (0.00236)
Short Term Compliance	0.829*** (0.0102)	0.829*** (0.0102)	0.829*** (0.0102)	0.829*** (0.0102)	0.830*** (0.0108)	0.829*** (0.0109)
Average Depth of Demand (adjusted)	0.147*** (0.0200)	0.147*** (0.0201)	0.147*** (0.0200)	0.147*** (0.0202)	0.139*** (0.0209)	0.140*** (0.0209)
Civil War				-0.00762 (0.00805)	-0.00294 (0.00858)	-0.00370 (0.00875)
Any War				0.00261 (0.00994)	0.00400 (0.0107)	0.00272 (0.0108)
Log GNI/pc						0.00196 (0.00124)
Log Population						0.00234 (0.00159)
Log Area						-0.000785 (0.00123)
Any Resolution	0.0413 (0.0559)	0.0409 (0.0560)	0.0412 (0.0559)	0.0408 (0.0561)	0.0544 (0.0584)	0.0571 (0.0584)
Constant	0.000669 (0.00170)	7.36e-05 (0.00173)	0.000788 (0.00176)	0.00102 (0.00180)	-0.00569** (0.00278)	-0.0474** (0.0204)
Observations	2,637	2,637	2,637	2,618	2,424	2,424

OLS estimation at the country level. Compliance measured by IPI ranges from 1 to 4, a nominal value of zero was added to country-year pairs that were not named in any resolution. We added a dummy indicating whether a country has been named by any resolution in a given year. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A5: Compliance to Resolutions on Civil War from 1989 to 2003 at the Resolution Level

VARIABLES	Medium Term Compliance			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Depth 1	0.381*** (0.128)	0.313*** (0.120)	0.381*** (0.128)	0.322** (0.134)
Depth 2	0.260** (0.105)	0.198** (0.0980)	0.260** (0.105)	0.251** (0.109)
Short Term Compliance 1	-6.967*** (0.244)	-7.037*** (0.230)	-6.967*** (0.244)	-6.925*** (0.256)
Short Term Compliance 2	-4.772*** (0.228)	-4.861*** (0.216)	-4.772*** (0.228)	-4.659*** (0.239)
Short Term Compliance 3	-2.804*** (0.218)	-2.880*** (0.207)	-2.804*** (0.218)	-2.773*** (0.230)
Elected	-1.029*** (0.375)		-1.029*** (0.375)	-1.086*** (0.382)
Security Council		0.0142 (0.225)	0.00360 (0.226)	-0.0372 (0.317)
Rotation Norm				0.221*** (0.0711)
Log GNI/pc				0.0506 (0.0684)
Log Population				0.0967 (0.0829)
Log Area				-0.0800** (0.0396)
Constant 1	-6.264*** (0.246)	-6.340*** (0.233)	-6.263*** (0.246)	-5.124*** (1.171)
Constant 2	-2.789*** (0.225)	-2.945*** (0.214)	-2.789*** (0.226)	-1.645 (1.168)
Constant 3	-0.269 (0.187)	-0.323* (0.174)	-0.268 (0.187)	0.881 (1.161)
Observations	2,152	2,465	2,152	1,992

Ordered logistic estimation at the resolution level. Compliance is measured from 1 to 4. In this table, the unit of measure is a resolution. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. *Depth i* and *Short Term Compliance j* are dummy variables for the difficulty of the task (measured between 1 and 3), and the compliance within one year (measured between 1 and 4).